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1. Introduction. I don't know who the first person was to use 
the words internal and external in discussing argumentation and 
evidence in linguistics, but whoever it was had an axe to grind: the 
very choice of words shows a bias in favor of the inten1al ('inside'). 
In fact, the history of discussions about these matters is full of 
invidious comparisons built not only into the names internal and 
external but also into various alternative names (for example, 
Skousen's 1975 proposal to call external evidence substantive 
evidence and thereby to elevate it). Here I will ask three 
questions. First, where does the issue of internal vs. external 
evidence arise in doing linguistics? Why is it in fact a problem for 
linguists, particularly phonologists? I will then spend a fair amount 
of space discussing what counts as internal end what as external, a 
question sloughed off by the other contributors with brief references. 
Finally, what is to be done? I conclude with a few prescriptions for 
phonologists. 
2. Why is it an issue? I can see at least four places in 
linguistics where the issue of internal vs. external considerations 
comes up. To begin with, it arises in the very delimitation of the 
tasks of linguistics, or particular subfields within linguistics, that 
is, in the division of labor between linguistics and other fields and in 
the division of labor among the various subfields of linguistics. You 
might wonder why there should be such a division of labor. There is, of 
course, the truly practical reason that everybody can't do everything. 
But there is a much deeper reason, which follows from the hypothesis 
that genuinely differer1t sorts of accounts are going to be required 
for the various fields and subfields. 
If you have a particular view about the way in which fields of 
inquiry should be cut up, you have already made certain (a priori) 
decisions about what's 'in' and what's 'out' of linguistics or your part 
of it, If you believe that linguistics is sociolinguistics or that 
linguistics is psycholinguistics, you will as a result have JDade 
decisions about what kinds of evidence will without question be relevant 
to doing linguistic analysis. If you believe that what is sometimes 
called 'phonology' is really two separate subfields of linguistics--
let's call them allophonics and morphophonetics--and your 
interest is in the former, then you will label certain data as outside 
the domain of your inquiry from the very beginning of the enterprise. 
Even, however, within essentially the same delimitation of the 
task for linguistics in general and phonology in particular, questions 
of what's internal and what's external arise when we're choosing among 
alternative sets of theoretical assumptions. In (the very frequent) 
situations where phenomena from some other field are brought to bear on 
the choice of theoretical framework for linguistics, we need, as 
Wolfgang Dressler pointed out quite cogently in his contribution, 
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linking sssU111ption:1 (what Rudolf Botha calls 'bridge hypotheses') 
that will connect linguistics and the other field. If, fo1· example, you 
are concerned about the existence of the phoneme as an entity that 
requires BJ1 account in a phonological descriptio11 of language and you 
would like to bring evidence from slips of the tongue to bear on this 
issue, you are obliged to give some account of what connects slips of 
the tongue and the abstract analytic object, the phoneme, and to show 
moreover that slips of the tongue are in some way relevant to the 
analytic issue. Similar obligations ensue if you are choosing a 
specific feature system end you propose to appeal to articulatory, 
acowstic, or auditor·y phonetics; you are obliged to supply the 
assumptions that connect the various subfields of phonetics with the 
(again abstract) analytic fraiaework being proposed for phonology. 
A third place in which the internal/external distinction appears 
is in choosing, within a given theoretical framework, among alternative 
accounts of essentially the same facts. What I just said about choosing 
among theories goes in spades for choosing alte1·native accounts. In 
this case you need not 011ly the linking assumptions w1d a way to 
determine relevance, but you also need to ascertain that the facts in 
question are relevant to these particular analytic choices--not just to 
phonology in general, but to the particular problem at hand. 
At this point, I'll discuss briefly, and without giving any actual 
linguistic fontts, a problem in the analysis of Sanskrit that has 
exercised me for what seems like en eternity now, namely what's 
sometimes called the ru}d r-ule. I'm going to have to call it the 
ruki pher1011Je1Jon, because what's al issue is whether we are deali11g 
with one, two, three, four, sixteen, or whatever separate cases, each 
requiring its own independent descriptio11 in a phonology of classical 
Sanskrit . The r·uki phenomenon involves the appearance of a retroflex 
/s/ 1·ather thw1 a dental /s/ in the environment after the segments 
/r u k i/. Now, 1aost phonologists hearing this for the first time are 
somewhat taken aback by it. It would not have occurred to most people 
that these segments might constitute a natural class. The literature 
includes quite a number of analyses which assume that these four 
segmental do constitute a natural class, as well as a number of 
challenges to this assumption, these giving 1·ise to various suggested 
reanalyses. Fo1· example, the proposal of Allen (1954) is essentially 
that there are three separate rules, causing retroflexion after /r/, 
palatalization after /i/, end velarization after /k u/, with all three 
types of affected /s/ realized as /s/. Venne,aann JOs. (1972) groups back 
/k u/ wlth palatalizing /i/ as retracting seglllents, versus retroflecting 
/r/. Dttvid Stampe has suggested to me grouping /k u r/ together as 
1·etracting segments- assuming that reb·oflex segme:uts in general are 
classed as back--versus front /i/. And one of my proposals (Zwicky 
1970) grouped the sonorants /r u i/ against the obstruent /k/. The 
unity of the ruki class has been defended in turn by several writers: 
fot· instance, Vennemwm hiJllSelf opts for a 11atural class position 011 
ruki (maintaining that the four segments are united by their acoustic 
effect of 'lowering the frequencies of the energy concentration in a 
following~'), while SoJ111Derstein (1973:53f,) argues that they are just 
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the [+high] seginents (/s/ being distinguished from /s/ as [+high] and•[-ant].) The main reason given for preferring one of these proposals 
over the others has to do--this should be clear from the sampling of 
ideas I've just given--with the phonetic motivation for the shift of 
dental /s/ to retroflex /f/· In order to make sense out of this 
reference to phonetic motivation, we have to supply quite a few 
intermediate assumptions that link the content of phonological rules to 
particular phonetic properties--the sorts of links that John Ohala and 
others have tried to supply over the years. I'm not going to work 
through the details here, but I should point out some of the more 
obvious problems with the proposals I've mentioned, such as Stampe's 
treating postalveolar /r/ as back but palatal /i/ as front, the 
widespread assumption that the nonlow vowels are retracting in effect 
(this despite the facts that all vowels are articulated back of /s/ 
and that /a/ is further back than /i/), and the contradiction between 
Vennemann's lowering proposal and SoJJDDerstein's raising analysis. The 
crosslinguistic survey in Bhat (1973) deepens the mystery; it 
identifies, as factors promoting retroflexion, (a) a preceding~, 
whether retroflex or not, (b) a following retroflex consonant, (c) a 
following back vowel, (d) implosion, (e) word-initial position, and (f) 
neighboring velars or palatals. 
I entered this arena in (1970) with an observation, not about the 
phonetic motivation of the rule or rules involved in Sanskrit, but 
rather about their susceptibility to exceptions. I repeated some well 
known facts about the ruki phenomenon: There are no exceptions 
whatsoever involving /k/ (that is, there are simply no attested 
instances of dental /s/ after /k/); there are exceptions (relatively 
few) in the case of /r/, and a rather substantial number in the case of 
/u/ and /i/. Thus there is a difference in the degree of exceptionality 
of /k/ versus /r u i/. I assumed that, ceteris paribus, you would 
expect the exceptions to a rule to be evenly distributed across the 
various environments in which the rule applies. Since this is not the 
situation for the ruki phenomenon, I suggested that there were actually 
two rules, as described above. 
Now I supplied no linking assumptions that would connect the 
distribution of exceptionality to the desirability of subsuming some 
phenomena in a single rule or describing it in more than one, and I 
can't entirely recover the steps in my reasoning, but it seems necessary 
to reconstruct an intermediate step using the linking assumptiou that 
rules describing a single phenomenon must correspond to some unitary 
mental representation. Such an assumption, which would make the various 
subparts of a rule not open to separate learning or variation, would 
provide a way of getting fro10 exceptionality facts to a decision about 
the one-rule/several-rules character of a phenomenon. But now that I've 
stated that linking assumption, it's not at all clear that any of us 
would want to subscribe to it. Still, something like it is needed if 
the facts alluded to are to bear as evidence 011 the analytic issue at 
hand. 
A fourth way in which the internal/external difference appears in 
linguistics is post facto--in attempts to explain why some description 
(or even whole theory) takes the form that it does. Many appeals to 
ease of articulation, to avoidance of ambiguity, or in general to the 
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large class of what have come to be called 'functional expltlllations' in 
linguistics are a posteriori (Kaye 1978): They do not claim to predict 
that the phenomenon in question must have occurred, but instead they 
claim to provide some sort of after-the-fact insight into why language 
should be the way it is. A rich collection of 'external' explanations 
has been provided (and challenged) in this area; see, for instance, many 
of the papers in Grossman, San, and Vance (1975). 
Next, a few wor·ds about why linguists are so exercised about these 
mt1tters, especially why phonologists are (it is almost impossible to 
look at work in phonology without an issue of external validation of 
some sort appearing). I would like to say that the problem in phonology 
is that there are simply so 111ariy alternatives available within 
aboost any existing theoretical frwnework, and consequently that it's 
very hard to believe that the sort of evidence usually classed as 
internal could decide among the alternatives. 
The sort of evidence that is without question internal deals with 
alternation and co-occurrence in the forms of linguistic 
units--the alternative forms of morphemes, words, and possibly phrases 
(in the case of phonology), as well as the restrictions on the 
occurrence of phonological units, within morphemes, words, and phrases, 
with respect to one another. Almost always we are dealing with what are 
in fact a finite number of items (granted, a rather large finite 
number), distributed within domains that are also finite, so that in 
most cases that have been considered in the phonological literature it 
would actually be possible to list all of the alternative fonns, and 
list all of the relevant domains, and stop there. Such an analysis 
wouldn't be in any sense explaoator·y, but it is at least conceivable. 
What I'm suggesting, then, is that there comes a point--and it may 
come fairly soon if you're hard-working--at which you've essentially 
exhausted all available evidence of the alternation and co-occurnmce 
types. All the relevant facts are probably in hand, but your 
descriptive frruoework still provides a very large number of alternative 
descriptions. That is, I see the need for so-called external evidence 
in phonology as one arising from a real crisis in analysis. 
Halle (1978) has maintained that if you look hard enough, then 
simplicity in the special technical sense of generative grammar will in 
fa~t decide such issues for you. In this paper Halle discusses issues 
in the description of three languages (Maori, Turkish, and Fitmish) and 
claims that analyses which had be~n argued for on so-called functional 
grounds in fact would be supported by technical simplicity arguments 
alone, and consequently that the functional considerations were 
irrelevant for the purpose of deciding among alternative analyses. 
Halle here introduces a consideration that I haven't yet officially 
discussed, namely, some brand of simplicity. Simplicity considerations 
are not raw facts about the phonology of a language; we're not 
talking about the number of ways in which a particular morpheme can be 
pronounced or what the privileges of occurrence of s01oe phonological 
unit are with respect to its neighbors. 
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3. What's in and what's out? Halle's claim leads me to a 
discussion of what will count as internal or external, beyond facts of 
alternation and co- occurrence. Before leaving these latter sorts of 
facts, I should say that I'm not concerned here with the issue of how 
you get facts about alternation and co- occurrence--whether they are 
obtained by observation, by introspection, by experimentation, or by 
elicitation, and what particular methods, within those four general 
types, are employed. I'm assuming that these facts are available to us, 
however they may be discovered, though I do point out that such 'facts' 
are in fact actually already low-level generalizations of some sort. 
I will also sidestep serious discussion of two cases, productivity 
and variation, which seem to be problematic for anyone examining 
inten1al/external evidence. It is very hard to detenuine whether the 
productivity of some generalization should count as internal 
evideuce- -it is often used without commeut, but you might reasonably 
feel that such considerations go beyond records of actual linguistic 
behavior and examine poteJJtial linguistic behavior, thus 
manipulating subjects in a quasi - experimental way. In the case of 
variation, other than that within the speech of a single person, the 
problem is the familiar one of whether it is an individual linguistic 
system that is being described, or a system shared by a social group. 
I'm going to have to asswne that some sort of pronouncement by fiat has 
been made in these two cases. 
Let me begin with systemic considerations that can play a role 
in evaluating alternative analyses . Here I would like to take seriously 
the idea (enunciated by Chomsky on many occasions) that a linguist's 
granunar is a theory of a language or part of a language. In fact, 
I'm going to borrow from discussions in the philosophy of science a list 
of considerations which are often used in choosing among alternative 
theories within some scientific field ; I will treat them as 
considerations which can be used in choosing amon~ alternative 
descriptions of some aspect of a language (this discussion will exhibit 
a general indirect influence of Botha's work). 
The first of these I include for completeness: the degree to 
which a theory, or in our case a description of some aspect of a 
language, is explicit. If it's not sufficiently explic it it will be 
disfavored with respect to alternatives, other things being equal. 
A very important consideration has to do with the fit between 
some proposed description and existing descriptions, or between the 
proposed description and the remainder of the theory within which the 
description is embedded. This particular consideration is almost 
invariably considered to be internal, and it's quite frequently used. 
You will find discussions in phonology, for example, of some analysis 
with the observation that it would require extrinsic ordering but that 
the theoretical framework within which the writer is working disallows 
extrinsic ordering of phonological rules, so that this analysis is 
disfavored with respect to alternatives consistent with universally 
determined rule application. That's a reference to a fit of a 
particular proposal with the surrounding theory. Similar remarks apply 
for analyses that require cyclic application of phonological rules. As 
it happens, both extrinsic ordering and cyclic rule application are 
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relevant in the case of the ruki phenomenon. My earliest analysis 
(Zwicky 1965) required both features. As a result, it is favored or 
disfavored depending on its fit with quite general assumptions 
conceruing the nature of phonology. 
The next two considerations make a tight pair. The first has to 
do with the cOJ11pleteness or exhaustiveness or C0111prel1ensive-
ness that we require of an account, and the second with the degree 
to wbid1 it's co11finned by evidence within the language (including the 
extent to which there are 'independent• lines of evidence). The idea 
here is that we favor the desc1·iptions which cover all of the 
potentially relevant facts (or at least as many as possible) and we 
favor those which have lots of confinning evidence within the language 
and relatively little disconfinning evidence. I don't have much now to 
say about such considerations, though I must mention a horrible problem 
in this area, namely that of distinguishing counterexamples from true 
linguistic exceptions. This is the type of problem that does not arise 
for physicists in the corresponding situation; for them, there are 
counterexamples and that's it . As you all know, languages have real 
exceptions, plenty of them in fact. But when we are talking about what 
confirms 01· discoufirms a description or theoretical proposal we somehow 
have to distinguish the plain old linguistic exceptions from true 
anomalies . 
Next we come to simplicity in a nontechnical sense (the sense 
in which simplicity is treated in the philosophy of science, not 
necessarily the sense of simplicity to which Halle alluded, though they 
are not unrelated). I refer here to considerations having to do with 
the uumber of primitive concepts or tenns, with the uumber of 
hypotheses, with the relative internal complexity of hypotheses, and so 
on. It's almost impossible to find an argument in phonology that can be 
unpacked without soine reference to simplicity in a nontechnical sense, 
and the importance of simplicity in this sense has nothing to do with 
whether or not an analyst subscribes to something like the ChOJaSkyan 
evaluation metric. Consider the ruki phenomenon. What, after all, 
would be wrong with saying there were four different rules? Why is one 
better than four or two or three or sixteen? Unpacking this why 
leads you to a set of assumptions about the desirability of relatively 
simple accounts. What would be wrong with saying that the rule(s) take 
/s/ as basic and derive /s/ from it? After all, the set of non-ruki 
envirouments is small in comparison to the set of ruki enviromaents (see 
footnote 1). However, the relevant Sanskrit forms fall into two JOain 
classes--those showing /s/ in non-rukl environments and /s/ in ruki 
environments, and those showing /s/ in all euvirorunents--so that if /s/ 
is taken as basic for the first class of forJUS, some way must be found 
to distinguish alternating fonns with putative basic /s/ from 
nonalternating fonns (which always have /s/), for the reverse-ruki rule 
must apply only to the fonner set. The upshot is that the basic-/s/ 
analysis will necessarily be more complex (in one of a number of 
different possible ways) than the basic-/s/ analysis. 
Now I must observe that as I continue through this list of 
considerations relevant to choosing linguistic analyses, it becomes less 
aud less clear that we are dealing wlth matters that are in fact 
internal to linguistics, or to phonology, Appeals to simplicity could 
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be claimed to be appeals to particular metatheories of linguistics, to 
those favoring certain kinds of descriptions and theories over others. 
And it could be claimed that metatheoretical preferences are not matters 
internal to linguistics (1nuch less phonology), but rather are principles 
of philosophy, consequently outside the domain of linguistics itself. 
When we come to the next consideration, (Popperian) 
falsifiability, doubts rise still further. The proposal here is 
that the description or the theory that makes the strongest possible 
claims is to be preferred: the one that makes the largest number of 
predictions, of the most varied sorts, and that countenances the 
narrowest range of facts. Here the feeling that we are appealing to a 
metatheoretical principle outside the domain of linguistics bec01nes even 
stronger. 
When we reach the consideration of plausibility, we are 
explicitly referring to principles outside our domain. What is at issue 
here is the plausibility of a description (or whole theory) with respect 
to some other theory, whether the latter is actually formulated 
explicitly or not. In linguistics such considerations appear as 
references to phonetic plausibility (to articulatory mechanisms or to 
perception), to the learnability of some proposed systen,, or to the 
facts of historical change, for instance. We ask questions like the 
following. Is this description plausible with respect to historical 
change? Could it have arisen by known forms of historical change? 
Would future historical development shed some light on the nature of the 
present system? Is the particular description plausible with respect to 
what we know about how poetic forms work in the language in question? 
Or with respect to how language play operates there? These are matters 
that you have heard discussed in some detail by earlier contributors. 
They are also situations in which we are desperately in need of 
linking assumptions. The most extensive discussion of these questions 
that I know of (focussing on historical change, language play, and 
acquisition) is Chunna (1979) (see also the useful brief surveys in 
Sonunerstein 1977:sec. 9.2.2). Churma's work brings us little cheer, for 
one of its lessons is that it is very hard to supply linking 
assumptions that both (a) are plausible on their own grounds as 
assumptions about some domain other than language structure, and also 
(b) do the work of linking linguistics with the other domain. The 
linking assumptions have to be sufficiently strong actually to bridge 
the two domains, but they also have to be independently credible. 
In the case of acquisition, for example, the first linking 
assumption you are tempted to make is that children hit on mental 
representations for various aspects of their language and then don't 
give them up. That particular linking assumption would permit many 
familiar arguments connecting the facts of acquisition with adult 
language structure to go through, but the linking assumption is quite 
incredible, in my opinion. Trying to refine the assumption in such a 
way as to make it believable--while still connecting the facts of 
language acquisition to the nature of the adult system--is very 
difficult. 
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I should point out that plausibility considerations play a role 
not only with respect to linguistics and the allied disciplines, but 
also in treating some subarea of linguistics as against others. 
Suppose, for example, we're working within a theory in which allophonics 
and morphophonemics are distinguished and we're talking about 
morphophonemics. Then questions of phonetic motivation are at several 
removes from our domain of inquiry, being directly relevant to 
allophonics rather than morphophonemics. As far as morphophonemics is 
concerned, phonetic plausibility is an external consideration, and we 
need the smne kinds of linking assumptions that we need if we are going 
to connect phonology to, say, aphasia studies. 
As it happens, these last observations are germane to the ruki 
problem. There is every reason to think that the ruki phenomenon is 
morphophonemic. To begin with, the alternations in form involve two 
segments that are clearly different phonemes in Sanskrit (they are in 
contrast in uon-ruki enviromoents). Next, Kiparsky (1973:61-3) and 
O'Bryan (1974) have observed that the alternation between /s/ and/~/ is 
exceptionless (subject to a general proviso I'll mention in a moment) 
when the /s/ is suffix-initial; 2 the 1oany lexical exceptions all involve 
the failure of retroflexion within a morpheme. The retroflexion(s) will 
then make crucial reference to morpheme boundary (in Kiparsky's 
treatment, to the derived character of forms) and would as a result be 
classified as morphophonemic. It also appears that /s/ and /s/ within•morphemes are not distributed by rule but simply supplied as part of 
lexical entries. 
O'Bryan notes further that all remaining apparent exceptions to 
retroflexion are forms in which a retroflex continuant, /~/ or /r/, 
follows /s/ within the same word. There are then no lexically 
marked exceptions, and my (1970) argumentation is quite beside the point 
(even if a credible linking assumption could be pressed into service). 
Bear with me for one more chapter in the ruki story, for not all 
the mysteries have been solved. O'Bryan concludes, correctly, that her 
arguments permit the ruki phenomenon to be described by a single rule. 
But they don't require it to be so described. What licenses the 
description of morphophonemic alternations with one rule, two, or 
sixteen? Phonetic plausibility--which figures so prominently in the 
literature I cited earlier largely because it is problematic--·will 
have little to say in the ruatter. There is the fact that /r u k i/ are 
equally exceptionless in retroflecting morpheme-final /s/, but that fact 
is not of much ruoment: we don't expect many instances of lexical 
exceptionality in conditioning (as opposed to undergoing) morphophonemic 
rules, so that the exceptionlessuess of every Sanskrit morpheme in the 
environment of the rule is not surprising (there are cases of 
exceptiouality in conditioning- -see Coats (1970) and the survey 
discussion in Kenstowicz and Kisseberth (1979: 394--400)--but they are 
not connoon). 
I can imagine facts that would bear on the question, but I don't 
believe they are available in Sanskrit to point one way or the other. 
Consider the suffixes affected by retroflexion, and recall that we are 
dealing with a morphophonemic rule. Suppose that Robinson (1975), 
Skousen, and the Natural Generative Phonologists (among many others) are 
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correct in believing that morphologized rules are ordinarily learned in 
connection with specific morphological categories, and not as 
phonologically conditioned operations; in this case, there would be a 
set of rules, each referring to a specific affected /s/- initial 
morpheme. If different /s/-initial morpheioes were subject to different 
morphological conditions on retroflexion, we could ask whether each 
of these distinct morphophonemic rules applied identically after the 
four segments /r u k i/, or whether there were differences between one 
rule and another with respect to the effect of these four segments; a 
simplicity argument could be constructed for or against the unity of the 
ruki phenomenon in these circ~tances. But, alas, the retroflexion has 
no conditions of the appropriate type. It seems irritatingly free of 
morphological conditions as well as lexical exceptions. 
One final shot, harking back to ruy (1970) squib. The retroflexion 
of /s/ after /k/ is •surface true', in the sense of NGP : There are 
simply no /ks/ sequences within words in classical Sanskrit, while there 
are /rs us is/ sequences. In a desert of usable facts, this 
remains--/k/ is different from /r u i/ in its combinability with /s/, 
while there seem to be no sig11ificant morphological or phonological 
similarities among the four segments. I view this as a standoff, 
perhaps an everlasting one, given the unavailability of true native 
speakers for the collection of possibly relevant external evidence. 
4. What is to be done? Now to turn to some prescriptions and 
warnings. My first two prescriptions have to do with plausibility 
considerations that are •external' but within linguistics. 
The first is the prescription not to assume that phonology is 
parallel to syntax. We have no right to assume that the principles of 
argumentation that are appropriate in syntax necessarily carry over to 
phonology, that decisions about theoretical matters such as rule 
ordering in one domain carry over to the other, or that the formalisms 
appropriate for one domain are appropriate for the other. Let me say a 
few words about each of these points in turn. 
In Zwicky (1973) I pointed out that there is an asymmetry in 
argumentation between phonology and syntax. If you have shown, for 
example, that certain classes of English subjectless imperative 
sentences ought to be analyzed with underlying structures having a 
second-person subject, you're entitled to infer that other imperative 
sentences also have such underlying structures, even though the 
particular sentence you're looking at 1oight not have the kind of 
evidence that led you to this analytic decision in other cases. In 
phonology, as a rule, you can't do that. You're not licensed to move 
from a demonstration that a particular instance of the diphthong /ai/ 
has some underlying representation (let's say /i/) to the position 
that all instances of the diphthong /ai/ have this underlying 
representation. The difference between syntax and phonology in this 
case has to do, I claimed, with a difference in the nature of the 
domains, syntax being infinite in the appropriate sense, phonology 
finite. In any case, I think it's fairly easy to see that some of the 
argwoents you can make in one area do not carry over into the other. 
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With respect to the rule ordering issue, a case against 
language-particular ordering conditions for individual pairs of 
syntactic rules has been made fairly strongly (see especially Pullwo 
1976), though the issue is hardly closed. The parallel demonstrations 
in phonology are much weaker, in my opinion. In particular, examples of 
counterfeeding order in allophonics seeru to be fairly nwnerous and hard 
to analyze away. My guess is that language-particular rule ordering 
might be eliminable in syntax, but probably not in phonology. 
As for formalism, there's absolutely no reason to think that the 
fonnalisms suitable for, say, unbounded movement rules in syntax are 
going to have anything to do with those appropriate for phonology. 
Imagine alternative pronunciations of sentences in which some 
phonological segnient could appear in either of two positions, one an 
indefinite number of seglllents away from the other, but which are 
otherwise identical; I know of no such examples. In general, if you 
import syntactic formalisms wholesale into phonology what you get is 
usually nonsense. In fact, I'd hope that the two components would have 
quite different internal organization, since that would lead to a more 
falsifiable general theory. 
The second lesson is quite similar to the first: We have no right 
to assume (certainly not ahead of time) that allophonic processes are 
parallel to morphophonemic rules--that argumentation appropriate in one 
domain carries over to the other, that theoretical assumptions such as 
those about ordering carry over, or that formalisms appropriate for one 
will do for the other. The rather large number of people who have 
concerned themselves with distinguishing morphophonemics from 
allophonics (Skousen, Linell, Dressler, Stampe, and many many others) 
have been listing ways in which allophonic processes and morphophonemic 
rules always or sometimes are different from one another. If we take 
even a bit of this work seriously, then parallels in argumentation, 
theoretical assumptions, and formalisms cannot be assumed. And, as I 
pointed out earlier, if we want to import considerations appropriate to 
allophonics into discussions of morphophonemics (or vice versa, for that 
matter) we must supply linking assumptions to relate the two. 
The third prescription I feel silly giving, but the fact is it's 
so often not been taken that the waters of phonological argumentation 
have been considerably muddied. This is the prescription to survey the 
full set of alternation and co-occurrence phenomena to be analyzed in a 
language. It's astonishing the extent to which intricate analyses with 
far-reaching consequences are proposed on quite incomplete sets of what 
count for phonology as primary data. Even such a work as The Sound 
Pattern of English, which takes on a very wide range of phenomena 
(morphophonemics and allophonics together, with a very heavy emphasis on 
morphophonemics), misses a great many relevant allophonic phenomena, and 
even some of the more prominent morphophonemic alternations. It has no 
treatment of the analysis of the regular English inflectional suffixes, 
that classic of beginning linguistic courses. Yet settling on a 
description of these facts is not an easy matter, being tied up in very 
complicated ways with other aspects of English phonology and morphology 
(see Zwicky (1975) for more discussion of these issues than anyone might 
want). Now I would give SPEhigh marks on coverage of the facts--it 
would be easy to cite much worse examples, including some from my own 
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work--but there are still significant gaps. I am surprised that 
phonologists generally don't adopt the strategy of actually listing, 
ahead of time, all of the phenomena they believe might be relevant to 
their analyses. 
Finally, I would like to repeat the prescription that linguists, 
and particularly phonologists, supply the assumptions that bridge the 
subparts of linguistic description and that connect linguistics to the 
allied disciplines. I don't think my 1970 discussion of ruki and 
exceptions is at all extraordinary in its failure to show how the 
proffered data are relevant to the analytic issue. Nor do I think that 
such potential lines of evidence should just be eschewed on the grounds 
that they're 'external'; as I argued at the beginning of this paper, I 
think phonological analysis needs all the help it can get. But it needs 
real underpinning, not cardboard props. 
:Notes 
*This paper grows out of Zwicky (1981) and material prepared for a 
seminar on methodology and argwnentation at the Ohio State University in 
the spring of 1981. It was originally presented at the University of 
Michigan in May 1981, as part of a series on evidence in phonology 
organized by Richard Rhodes and Peter Benson; I have not tampered much 
with its conversational tone. This is the version of 27 August 1981. 
!Actually, these four segments represent a good many more. '/u/' 
stands for a short vowel phoneme and a long one; for /o/, which 
functions like /a+ u/ in Sanskrit; end for /aw/, which functions like 
/a: + u/. '/i/' similarly stands for/ii: e ay/. '/r/' stands for 
syllabics, both short and long, as well as for a nonsyllabic retroflex 
segment. /k/ before /s/ is the product of neutralizations affecting all 
palatal and velar stops (/c ch j jh k 1<11 g ff1/) and certain instances of 
the fricatives Its/. /s/ remains after nasals, the vowels ha a:h, 
labials, dentals, end /t/ (the neutralization product oft t d d / and 
of the remaining insten~es of /s s/); the liquid /1/ does·n~t ~c~ur•before /s/.
2Readers who know Sanskrit might wonder about ste.-initial /s - s/.
alternations in compounds and prefixed forms; they are remarkably 
irregular. Kiparsky (1973:84- 5) argues that in classical Sanskrit these 
alternations are to be described separately from the r·uki phenomenon 
proper (in some cases the alternation appears even in non-ruki 
environments). 
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